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PERSONAL FAILURE, INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE,
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT*
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER**

I agree with Professor Schulhofer's main thesis: The problem of guaranteeing the effective assistance of counsel cannot be solved within a plea bargaining system.' The reasons for this conclusion fall under two main
headings. First, a system of plea negotiation is a catalyst for inadequate representation. It subjects defense attorneys to serious temptations to disregard
their clients' interests, engenders suspicion of betrayal on the part of defendants, and aggravates the harmful impact of inadequate representation when it
occurs. Second, a plea negotiation system insulates attorneys from review and
often makes it impossible to determine whether inadequate representation has
occurred.
As Professor Schulhofer suggests, almost every defense of plea negotiation depends on the assumption that defendants will be well-represented. 2
Apologists for plea bargaining draw pictures of well-informed defendants, advised by capable attorneys, making rational assessments of surrender and
gain.3 These apologists know that, were they to peer into the pit, they often
would find their assumptions unjustified. Nevertheless, they regard the defective performance of lawyers as exogenous to a plea bargaining system. In their
view, inadequate lawyers are as likely to appear and work their mischief in one
system as another; whether their cases are bargained or tried is immaterial. 4
Although these observers condemn departures from their idealized models as
abuses, they evaluate the institution of plea bargaining by examining how the
process might work with Earl Warren as the prosecutor, Socrates as the defense attorney, and Solomon as the trial judge. These observers wear blinders.
They are somewhat like the people who once proclaimed that monarchy is a
marvelous form of government so long as the king is good. Although apolo*

EDS. NoTE: Normally it is the policy of the Review to use female pronouns for the third

person singular when the pronoun is used generically. However, at the time this paper was
accepted for publication, this policy was not mandatory.
** Professor of Law, Russell Baker Scholar and Acting Director, Center for Studies of
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1. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Sac.
CHANGE 137 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Schulhofer, Effective Assistance].
2. Cf., ag., id.
at 140, 144.
3. Eg., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Easterbrook, CriminalProcedureas a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); Church, In Defense of "BargainJustice", 13
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 509 (1979); Hyman, Bargaining and CriminalJustice, 33 RuTGERS L
REv. 3 (1980).
4. E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 309-10; Church, supra note 3, at 521; Hyman, supra
note 3, at 14.
149

HeinOnline -- 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 149 1986

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change

REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. XIV:149

gists for plea negotiation usually recognize that the king may not be good, they
argue that no system can be better than the people who administer it.

I
My principal goal in this paper is to demonstrate that institutional arrangements make a difference and that the performance of lawyers is not exogenous. A regime of plea negotiation lends itself to ineffective assistance and
aggravates its harmful consequences in at least six ways that an adjudicative
system5 does not.
First, like other people, defense attorneys like money. A plea bargaining
system subjects these attorneys to powerful financial temptations to disregard
their clients' interests. For obvious practical reasons, privately retained defense attorneys usually collect their fees in advance; and once an attorney has
pocketed his fee, his economic interests lie in disposing of the case as rapidly
as possible. The most rapid way to dispose of a case is usually to enter a bargained plea. A similar conflict of interest besets some appointed attorneysthose who receive small statutory payments for every case in which they appear. The statutory compensation is never a great reward for conducting a
two-day trial; but for many lawyers, the burdens of representing the indigent
become tolerable when these burdens consist of a brief conference with the
client, a brief conference with the prosecutor, and a brief courtroom colloquy
before a negotiated plea is accepted.'
Second, apart from the desire to make money, attorneys like to minimize
work. Plea negotiation offers defense attorneys a more comfortable way of life
than does adjudication. As salaried lawyers whose compensation does not depend on the ways in which their cases are resolved, public defenders are not
subject to the same economic temptafions as private defense attorneys. Never5. I use the term "adjudicative system" to include every system that does not reward or
encourage waiver of the right to trial. The term is not limited to the sorts of systems found in
Continental European nations-systems in which, with minor cases set aside, the guilty plea is
unknown so that every case is tried.
6. My contention is not that all or most defendants fail to receive effective assistance in a
plea bargaining system. It is that inadequate representation is likely to occur in a significant
number of cases, that it cannot be remedied effectively, and that the problem would be alleviated by moving toward an adjudicative system of the sort advocated by Professor Schulhofer.
Similarly, I do not claim that the deficiencies of a plea bargaining system discussed in this
commentary would, without more, warrant the abandonment of plea bargaining. These remarks merely explore some of the many subordinate injustices to which a fundamentally unjust
practice has led.
7. Although a defense attorney's financial interests usually favor the entry of a plea of
guilty, these interests occasionally push in the opposite direction. Consider, for example, an
assigned counsel system that compensates attorneys on an hourly basis. Attorneys who regard
the prescribed hourly rate as inadequate may be tempted to put the burdens of their assignments
behind them by entering bargained pleas of guilty. Attorneys who lack more remunerative uses
of their time, by contrast, may be tempted to "milk" their assignments. These attorneys may
take cases to trial when that course would not be in their clients' interests. The point is simply
that a defense attorney often has personal interests in his client's choice of plea that differ from
those of the client himself.
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theless, all lawyers are subject to the temptation to promote their own convenience at the expense of their clients. As with the economic temptations noted
above, the danger is not so much deliberate betrayal as warped judgment and
excessive use of shortcuts. As one judge noted, "It is easier to sit in an overstuffed chair drinking coffee than to stand in the courtroom trying cases."' It
is also easier to banter with prosecutors about kids, lakehouses and justice
than to march into the field to learn the facts or into the library to learn the
law.
Somewhat similar conflicts of interest would influence the performance of
defense attorneys in an adjudicative system. There are a variety of ways to
bluff, cut corners, and "wing it" when a case is tried. Nevertheless, the trial
process constrains the ability of lawyers to shrug off most forms of hard work
as unnecessary. At trial, an attorney must at least listen to the prosecution's
witnesses and decide whether and how to cross-examine them. Even if the
attorney has conducted no pretrial investigation, his client may have suggested
some defense witnesses (including the client himself). The attorney must either
call these witnesses to testify or explain to his client why he has not. In addition, the attorney must participate in the formulation of the court's instructions, argue to the jury, and more. An attorney who wished to appear
competent in performing these visible tasks would be likely to investigate the
facts before trial, speak to his witnesses, research the relevant law and prepare
in other ways. He would not have an easy way to conclude his representation
in minutes and rationalize his lack of vigorous advocacy as the best possible
representation of his client.
In a typical shop or factory, some employees work harder than others,
but the possibility of defective performance on the job does not suggest that it
is immaterial whether the manager of the shop or factory requires its employees to report for work. Similarly, the temptations to cut corners that defense
attorneys would experience in an adjudicative system cannot be equated with
the more powerful conflicts of interest that confront them in our plea bargaining system.
Third, like other people, attorneys like to be liked and to enjoy good relationships with co-workers. This personal interest, like the others, can lead defense attorneys to represent their clients less vigorously. In a plea bargaining
system, prosecutors and trial judges-the group with whom a defense attorney
works every day-are likely to become a more important constituency than
the attorney's more transient clients. 9 As with the other temptations that I
have mentioned, scholars could -write treatises about this one, and some organizational theorists have.'° What these theorists sometimes have been slow to
8. See Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,76 COLUtM. L. REv. 1059,
1103 (1976) (quoting Judge Arthur L. Alarcon).
9. For an in-depth exploration of this phenomenon, see Guggenheim, Musings on Some
EthicalDilemmas for the InstitutionalCriminalDefense Attorney, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc.
CHANGE 13 (1986).
10. See, eg., J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JusTicE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANAL-
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recognize, however, is that there is a partial cure for the disease. An important
virtue of the administration of justice by juries and other impartial tribunals is
that it maximizes the extent to which outcomes depend on the facts of each
case and minimizes the influence of personal favoritism and favor-seeking. Juries in particular are not repeat players. An adjudicative system treats each
case as a tale in which the defendant has a major role rather than as a short
chapter in which he has a minor part. It reduces the chance that the defendant's interests will be sacrificed to build capital for the future, repay old debts,
or simply win the approval of co-workers for its own sake.
Plea bargaining promotes inadequate representation for a fourth reason.
Defense attorneys, like other people, do not want to be proven wrong. A decision to plead guilty, unlike a decision to stand trial, cannot be proven wrong.
A guilty plea not only masks prior errors and professional deficiencies but also
ensures the impregnability of a lawyer's professional judgment. Once a guilty
plea has been entered, no one can know what result a trial would have
reached. From the defendant's perspective, one can always suppose that the
outcome would have been worse. When an attorney takes a case to trial, by
contrast, he knows (and his client usually knows) what offer or bargaining
opportunity has been declined. At the conclusion of a trial, it may be evident
that the rejection of an offer has cost a defendant several years of his life. This
moment of recognition is unlikely to enhance a lawyer's self-esteem or make
future contact with the client more pleasant. Nevertheless, the risk of this unhappy moment can be avoided. A lawyer need only follow what is always the
safe and secure course in a plea bargaining system-persuade the client to
plead guilty.
A fifth reason why a regime of plea bargaining promotes inadequate representation is its secrecy and unwritten rules. These characteristics maximize
the dangers of inexperience. As one prosecutor observed, "Anyone who can
try a civil case can try a criminal case, but a civil lawyer is not qualified to
evaluate a criminal case. He has no way of knowing what a criminal case is
worth."'" Moreover, the danger is not simply that an inexperienced lawyer
may be unable to distinguish a good offer from a bad offer. In addition, the
lawyer may not know how to get a good offer. When does a lawyer push too
hard and harm his clients because courthouse insiders conclude that he is a
"shotgun who goes off half-cocked"? When does he fail to push hard enough
and harm his clients because insiders realize that they can take advantage of
him? How "reasonable" is too reasonable, and how "reasonable" is not reasonable enough? These questions are difficult, and defendants may suffer
while attorneys try to figure them out.
By contrast, trial is an open system-a system with reasonably well-deYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); P. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978).

11. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1269
(1975).
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fined roles and a system that can be studied, learned, and eventually mastered.
Moreover, even when an inexperienced attorney founders at trial, the witnesses usually tell their stories in a coherent fashion; the judge usually gives
reasonably accurate instructions on the law; the jurors usually follow both the
evidence and their consciences; and if the defendant is convicted, the judge
imposes the sentence that he thinks fair. An inexperienced defense lawyer can
harm his clients greatly at trial, but to a far greater extent than plea negotiation, trial is a system of checks and balances.
There is a sixth way in which the performance of defense attorneys in a
plea bargaining system differs from their performance in an adjudicative system. A conscientious lawyer in a plea bargaining system cannot be only an
advocate for his client. The lawyer must also be the point man or woman for a
coercive system of justice. It is the defense attorney who must deliver the
message that the client does not have an unfettered right to trial. It is the
defense attorney who must explain how the plea bargaining leverage works.
Some clients may be slow to get the message, and one public defender observed, "A lawyer shirks his duty when he does not coerce his client."'" The
duty of a conscientious lawyer is indeed to ensure that his client understands
what is at stake. In performing this duty, the lawyer may be required to use
such harsh language as: "I cannot beat this case. The jury wants your blood.
You will burn if you do not change your plea." 3
Although a well-intentioned lawyer who "coerces" his client may be effective in saving the client from an avoidable penalty, he is likely to be ineffective in another respect. He is unlikely to inspire his client's confidence. The
client may conclude that the lawyer does not believe in his case. In a plea
bargaining system, even a capable and conscientious defense attorney is likely
to incur the distrust and resentment of the person whom he seeks to serve.
One can envision a different role for a defense attorney-a role in which
the attorney could leave the judging to others and be unreservedly on his client's side. Nevertheless, an attorney could properly assume this role only in a
system that did not penalize the decision to present an adversary defense.
Perhaps, for some lawyers, the lofty ideals of our profession are an adequate answer to the temptations that I have described; but I confess that, were
I a defense attorney, these temptations would influence me. I might not join
the ranks of those lawyers who purposely betray their clients, who appear in
hundreds of cases every year and never try any of them, and who sometimes
even deceive their clients in order to persuade them to plead guilty. Nevertheless, it is a rare case in which a defense attorney cannot secure a plausible offer
from a prosecutor. After receiving a colorable offer, I could not forget that the
alternative to accepting it would be extra days of work-work which might or
might not benefit my client but which certainly would prove costly to me.
12. Id. at 1310.
13. Cf. Huot v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 91, 94, 292 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1973) (language
similar to that quoted in text).
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II
I will address only briefly the second set of reasons why insuring the effective assistance of counsel is and will remain a dream in our plea bargaining
system. In a system whose structure encourages inadequate assistance, no effective mechanism exists for determining whether inadequate assistance has
occurred. Nor does it seem likely that an effective mechanism can be created.
In 1984, after years of neglecting the issue, the Supreme Court articulated
a general standard for judging the effectiveness of counsel. In Strickland v.
Washington,14 a defendant who had pleaded guilty challenged the effectiveness
of his counsel at the sentencing proceeding that followed his plea. The
Supreme Court viewed the case as a vehicle for addressing in sweeping legislative fashion a broad range of issues likely to arise in effective assistance cases.' 5
The Court said:
In giving meaning to the [Constitutional] requirement, ... we must
take its purpose-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.16
In a system in which almost no one receives a trial, the terms of the
Court's long-awaited general formula for resolving claims of ineffective assistance were limited to trials. Perhaps this limitation reflected the myopic assumption that an adversarial trial is still the norm in the American system of
criminal justice. The limitation, however, may have reflected, not the Supreme
Court's naivety, but its sophistication. Only a defendant who has exercised the
right to trial has a significant chance of demonstrating that he has not received
the effective assistance of counsel. Perhaps, for this reason, the Supreme Court
concluded that guilty plea cases could be safely disregarded.
Despite the formal limitation of the Strickland standard to trials, the
proper application of the Court's approach to claims of ineffective assistance
in the guilty plea process seems apparent. The Strickland Court said:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
14. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15. Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda style of opinion writing, in
which a court roams at large through an area of the law, promulgates a doctrinal code, and
treats the facts before it almost as an afterthought, was unusual at the time of Miranda itself.
Thanks to a remaking of the Supreme Court in the name of "strict construction," however, this
nonjudicial style now appears to be the norm.
16. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
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fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.7
The court added that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential," that "a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," and that "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the pro18
ceeding would have been different."
Strickland imposes a heavy burden on defendants convicted at trial who
challenge the adequacy of the representation that they have received. At a
trial, however, both the attorney's courtroom performance and the evidence
presented by the prosecutor are matters of record. On rare occasion, a defendant may be able to point to specific misconduct, demonstrate that it was egregious, and show that competent representation probably would have altered
the outcome. In a guilty plea case, by contrast, both the attorney's conferences with his client and his conferences with the prosecutor are secret. The
absence of a record makes it extraordinarily difficult for a defendant to demonstrate that his plea was unreliable or that counsel's errors were likely to have
altered the outcome. Moreover, it is difficult for a reviewing court to know
what can be expected of an attorney in an unstructured bargaining situation.
As Professor Schulhofer has noted, one can conjure up a plausible reason for
almost any default in a plea bargaining system. 19
Strickland's heavy weighing of the scales against claims of ineffective
assistance drives the last nail into the coffin of the defendant whose inadequate
lawyer has led him to plead guilty. But this last nail hardly matters. Whatever
the formula for judging claims of ineffective assistance and whatever the facts,
the defendant who has been inadequately represented and induced to plead
guilty has almost no chance.
Ineffective representation is far more likely to occur in guilty plea cases
than in trial cases. The weakest members of the defense bar are not usually
the lawyers who put the state to its proof. Committing serious errors at trial
might be an enormous step forward for some attorneys. Nevertheless, defendants who have pleaded guilty are far less likely to secure relief on grounds of
ineffective representation than defendants who have been convicted at trial.
This irony is compounded by the fact that, in the Brady trilogy in 1970,20
the Supreme Court equated a knowing waiver with a competently counseled
waiver. The Court therefore refused to consider directly whether the defendants in the three cases before it had knowingly waived their constitutional
rights by entering guilty pleas. With rare exceptions, the Court has since permitted defendants who have pleaded guilty to secure relief only by shouldering
17. Id.
18. Id. at 687, 689, 694.
19. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance supra note 1, at 142.
20. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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the all-but-impossible burden of demonstrating that they did not receive the
effective assistance of counsel. 2
The American system of criminal justice is distinctive in three respects.
First, it makes the kind of justice that a defendant receives more dependent on
the quality of counsel than any other legal system in the world. Second, it
subjects defense attorneys to serious temptations to disregard their clients' interests. And third, it makes it impossible to determine whether defendants
have received the effective assistance of counsel. No proposed reform except
Professor Schulhofer's bold new model-the adversary criminal trial-holds
promise of eliminating these paradoxes.
21. Compare Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) with Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21 (1974) and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
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